With the growing body of literature on governance styles where nonprofit organizations are involved in creating and implementing public services, there is need for robust evidence on the effects of public funding on nonprofit revenues. This paper systematically reviews previous studies on the crowding-out hypothesis, which holds that private charitable donations are lower in situations of higher government support and vice versa. About two-thirds of previous estimates find a negative correlation (crowding-out), while one third of the estimates find a positive correlation (crowding-in). The results are strongly shaped by the research methods that are used. In experiments, a $1 increase in government support is associated with an average $0.64 decrease in private donations, while non-experimental data analyses find an average increase of $0.06. Random-effects regression models show that, contrary to arguments that are prevalent in the literature, studies that take subsidies to organizations as a measure of government support are more likely to estimate crowding-out than studies that use a measure of direct government expenditures. Central government support is associated with higher charitable donations, while measures that include multiple levels of government tend to find negative correlations. The results challenge the consistency of prior research findings and demonstrate the contextual dependence of the validity of the crowding-out hypothesis.
INTRODUCTION
How does the fundraising income of nonprofit organizations respond to changes in government funding? Over the last years nonprofit revenues in Western democracies have been pressured due to economic downturn and unreliable government funding. At the same time, government policies both in the US and abroad seek to increase the role of profit and nonprofit actors in the private sector, resulting in a 'hollow state' where government agencies and other actors jointly provide public services (Milward and Provan 2000) . Forms of governance that received a lot of attention include the outsourcing of public services through contracting (Smith and Lipsky 1993) , the involvement of non-state actors in consensus-based decision making (Ansell and Gash 2008) and the emergence of interorganizational networks to deliver public services (Milward and Provan 2003) . There has been much debate about the effectiveness of different governmentnonprofit collaborations. Besides internal characteristics like the institutional structure and management styles, an important condition for effective collaborations is the availability of resources in the organizational context (Ansell and Gash 2008; Milward and Provan 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) . Public goals can be funded through government support in the form of expenditures, subsidies, contracts or tax incentives, but also through nonprofit fundraising income. Despite the large body of governance literature, it is still unsure how different funding streams interact. Given that the nonprofit sector becomes increasingly involved in the creation and implementation of public policy, it is important to know how and when nonprofit organizations are able to acquire resources from their environment.
There is a wide array of studies dedicated to the crowding-out hypothesis. The theoretical foundations of the argument can be traced back to Alexis de Tocqueville (1970 Tocqueville ( [1840 ) and Robert Nisbet (1962 [1953 ), who argued that modern extensive democracies are detrimental for private control over the small things in life. A wide range of studies examined the effects of the scope of the welfare state on different forms of private participation to test this claim. The current meta-analysis focuses on private charitable money donations. Governments can enhance donations by matches or rebates (Eckel and Grossman 2003) , but our analysis is restricted to unconditional government grants. The argument in this literature is that increasing government contributions through taxes is associated with a drop in charitable donations from private donors.
While most findings provide evidence that donations are partly crowded out by government influence the estimated relationship between government funding and private contributions.
There has never been a systematic analysis carried out of the conditions for crowding-out to occur. Therefore this article provides answers to two questions: (1) how varied are relationships between unconditional government support and private charitable donations in previous empirical research, and (2) how can the variance in these relationships be explained?
We examine estimations of crowding-out as well as methodological and contextual characteristics in a meta-analysis of previous empirical articles. This contributes to the crowdingout literature in two ways. First, mapping methodological differences is extremely useful for further research in this area. A better understanding of the consequences of different methodologies allows for a sensible comparison between previous results and more careful future research design choices. Second, mapping contextual differences yields theoretically useful insights on the conditions under which high government support is associated with lower charitable donations.
In order to maintain a flourishing nonprofit sector that strengthen the efficacy of public policy, both public and nonprofit managers benefit from robust information about the effects of different types of government funding. From the side of policy makers, governing a hollow state means leaving public services to some extent in the hands of non-state actors with a distinctive relation to society, mainly relying on donors and volunteers instead of voters or consumers.
Evidence that high levels of public funding are detrimental for charitable giving would support ideas about government programs with large roles for nonprofit organizations that are dependent of private funding. From the side of nonprofits, there is tension between dependency of public funding and organizational autonomy (Froelich 1999; O'Regan and Oster 2002; Verschuere and De Corte 2014) . Brooks (2000b) argues that, ideally, charitable organizations would maximize the total sum of government subsidies and private giving, which is the most efficient mix of revenues. "In reality, however, charities may not be able to attract or control the right amount of subsidies, or may not understand the underlying relationship at work" (Brooks 2000b, p. 454) . A stronger knowledge about the effects of public funding on fundraising income would enable nonprofit managers to better position their organizations between government, local communities and other private actors.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In the next section we present hypotheses on the correlates of crowding-out estimates in previous research. In the Data and Methods section we present the methodology of the meta-analysis, while the Results section contains Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) and multivariate regression models to show how different study characteristics are correlated with the direction and magnitude of crowding-out that is estimated.
The article closes with a discussion and conclusion.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
In this section we formulate hypotheses on the correlates between characteristics in research design and the crowding-out estimate. We distinguish between hypotheses on data source, sample country, regression model and specification, and operationalization of the independent variable.
Data Source
Four data sources can be used to test the relation between government support and charitable donations: laboratory experiments, survey experiments, archival (e.g. tax) data and self-reported data. Lab experiments differ from real-world settings in "the nature and extent of scrutiny, the emphasis on the process by which decisions are made, the artificial limits placed on the action space, the imposition of task, the selection rules into the environments, and the stakes typically at risk" (Levitt and List 2007, p. 168) . Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez (2015) show that behaviors in a number of social preference games are largely uncorrelated with altruistic behaviors in surveys and field settings. However, the defining characteristics of laboratory experiments do not necessarily bias their outcomes in a systematically positive or negative direction. Camerer (forthcoming) argues that laboratory and field experiments often find the same results and that the problems with generalizability of lab experiments are exaggerated.
In the case of donors' reactions on government support, we hypothesize that laboratory experiments create a controlled environment with settings that make it more likely for crowdingout to occur. First, participants typically receive full information on the behavior of the "government" as simulated by the researchers. Most of the crowding-out experiments have a repeated-measure design in which participants not only are aware of the level of government support but also of changes therein, making it more likely that they change their giving behavior in different treatments. Horne, Johnson, and Van Slyke (2005) show that in reality many donors do not know how much public subsidies organizations receive. Second, participants are more sensitive to social cues because they know that they take part in a study. If people see changes in government support they suspect that this is supposed to affect their giving and, aware of being watched, they will change their donations. Third, participants in crowding-out experiments are almost always undergraduate students, arguably non-representative samples scoring lower on different measures of prosocial behavior and being more sensitive for experimental treatment (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010) . Carpenter, Connolly, and Myers (2008) show that students, especially males, give considerably lower amounts in experiments than a sample drawn from a broader population, but other studies showed that students and non-students do not differ in their level of giving in a dictator game with charities as recipients (Bekkers 2007) and in their change in giving as a reaction to changes in other participants' donations in trust games (Falk, Meier, and Zehnder 2013) . Fourth, participants in experiments receive an endowment from the researchers, making it easier to change levels of giving as the government's contribution is manipulated than in situations where they decide on their own expenditures.
At least the first two characteristics of lab experiments also hold for survey experiments.
In contrast to lab experiments, survey experiments are often carried out among a sample that is representative of the population. The only published survey experiment on crowding-out that we know of is a vignette experiment without any earnings for the participants (Kim and Van Ryzin 2014).
Crowding-out can also be tested with archival data, e.g. adopted from the American Internal Revenue Service 990 tax return forms. Despite serious doubts about the accuracy of reported information on 990 tax returns, data that organizations report in tax forms are highly correlated with those in audited financial statements (Froelich, Knoepfle, and Pollak 2000) .
Organizations' income from private donors is a relatively valid measure of aggregate real-world charitable donations.
As a final data source, crowding-out studies can use self-reported survey data on individual donations that are paired with financial data on government support from other sources. Although survey research has its own issues like sample selectivity and social desirability, self-reported data approximates donations that are made in absence of the conditions in experimental designs.
Two major and strongly related concerns for empirical crowding-out research are endogeneity and omitted variable bias. People not only donate but also affect the government by expressing their political preferences. These preferences drive both government support and donations, generating a positive omitted variable bias and suppressing crowding-out. In addition to preferences for societal goals, there are a large number of potential other factors that may be related with both public and private contributions. The endogenous relation between government support and private donations could suppress the crowding-out estimate in studies using archival or self-reported data.
In both archival and self-reported data, donors do not necessarily receive information on the actions of the government, the researcher demand effects are absent or weaker, the samples are generally less selective and participants decide on their own money. Experiments are able to measure the relation between two variables in a controlled environment, while studies using financial data from surveys or archives have to deal with other factors that interfere.
H1:
There are more and stronger crowding-out estimates in studies using experimental data than in studies using non-experimental data.
Sample Country
While most research on the relation between government support and charitable donations comes from the United States, it could very well be the case that this relation is systematically different in other countries. People from different countries differ in their stance towards social problems as either collective responsibility or government responsibility. Different welfare state regime types show different levels of support for extensive provision of public services by the government (Andress and Heien 2001; Svallfors 1997) . People who are used to extensive welfare state arrangements expect the government to take care of public services and might be reluctant to compensate for changing levels of government provision of public goods. In countries where public services are considered a shared responsibility for public and private actors, on the other hand, a donor is more willing to raise the level of donations to nonprofit organizations in order to reach the desired goals.
A possible explanation for country differences is that the marginal utility of donations decreases with the extensiveness of welfare state programs. It has been argued that the marginal increase in well-being derived from income is high for poor countries but diminishes with economic prosperity (Inglehart 2000) . The need for public or private provision of public services is more urgent in countries with more severe social problems. Welfare states differ in size and inclusiveness, and thus in their efficacy when aiming to alleviate problems like poverty, hunger and homelessness. Given that social needs are higher in countries with smaller welfare states, an additional dollar of contributions to alleviate those needs has a higher value compared to countries with extensive welfare states and less urgent social needs. It is likely that donors are more inclined to compensate for changing government support when the stakes are higher.
In sum, people in countries with smaller welfare states where the needs are more urgent and public goods are less strongly perceived as government responsibility should be more likely to compensate government support than countries where extensive government arrangements are favored. Following Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology we expect that people in liberal welfare state regimes, with lower government redistribution and more universalistic arrangements, are more responsive to changes in government support.
H2:
There are more and stronger crowding-out estimates in liberal welfare state regimes than in other welfare state regime types.
Regression Model and Specification
As mentioned above, studies using non-experimental data suffer from endogeneity and omitted variable bias that suppress crowding-out. We distinguish two ways to deal with such bias.
First, we expect that crowding-out estimates are stronger in empirical specifications that account for omitted variables. A simple OLS regression estimates the relation between both the level and the change in government support and private donations. If governments provide more support to organizations that also receive higher private contributions the estimates are upwardly biased. Fixed-effects specifications include dummies for the units of analysis (e.g. organizations), holding all time-invariant factors constant. First-difference estimations, regressing the changes in donations on the changes in government support, are another way to deal with the omitted variable issue.
Second, Payne (2009) argues that an empirical specification measuring only the exogenous part of government support, including two-staged least squares regression (2SLS), leads to less biased estimates. Instrumental variable regression is a way to deal with the endogeneity problem, using predictor variables that correlate with the independent but not with the dependent variable or its error term (Morgan and Winship 2007) . In these models, government support is regressed on one or more instrumental variables (like region characteristics or organizational characteristics) to model the part of government support that is exogenous. In the second stage of the regression, private donations are regressed on the exogenous part of government support, hereby reducing the upward bias that is due to organizations receiving both high government support and high private donations.
H3: There are more and stronger crowding-out estimates in fixed-effects and firstdifference specifications than in other model specifications.
H4: There are more and stronger crowding-out estimates in instrumental variable regression models than in other regression models.
Government Support
Our final set of hypotheses concerns the operationalization of the independent variable in primary studies. In experimental designs, researchers mostly simulate a government tax by imposing an involuntary contribution from participants. In non-experimental designs, we distinguish two dimensions that can raise differences.
First, measures of government support are either expenditures directly targeted at the need in society or subsidies to nonprofit organizations. Government support may have a direct effect on individual donations because people derive utility from the total amount that they contribute to the public good, either through taxes or through their own voluntary donations.
However, it is unlikely that people change their behavior when they are not aware of (changes in) government support (Horne, Johnson, and Van Slyke 2005) . Government support may also have an indirect effect on donations through the behavior of organizations, who play a crucial role because they collect donations and may increase their fundraising efforts when government support is lowered or vice versa. The latter effect has been labeled "fundraising crowd-out" and is a plausible explanation of the negative relation between government support and private donations (Andreoni and Payne 2003, 2011; Hughes, Luksetich, and Rooney 2014) . If organizational behavior explains changes in donations, studies that take subsidies to organizations as an independent variable provide more precise estimates that capture this effect and are more likely to yield crowding-out.
Second, both the central government and lower levels of government can provide support for nonprofit organizations. As is argued in the case of the US, federal grants are likely to not only have an effect on individual private donations but also on spending of lower levels of government, and both private donors and lower governments are responsive to one another. The term "joint crowd-out" refers to the collective effect of federal grants on both private and lower government support, while the direct effect of federal support on private donations is referred to as "simple crowd-out" (Steinberg 1989 (Steinberg , 1991 Lindsey and Steinberg 1990) . State and local governments tend to match federal grants, especially when those are targeted at specific needs and thus, private donors would not only substitute a decreasing federal government grant but also the decreasing local government support that sticks to federal money. Studies that only use a measure of central government spending or only a measure of spending at lower levels could overestimate the effect of government support because a part of the change in private donations is due to the change in spending by other levels of government. Studies that include a measure of total government support, or use a model that controls for other levels of government, are expected to provide weaker crowding-out estimates. 
DATA AND METHODS
In this paper we present a meta-analysis of a sample of previous studies on the crowding-out effect. To ensure comparability we limit our review to studies with the amount of donations of money as the dependent variable, either self-reported in surveys or observed in experiments or in archival (e.g. tax) data, and the amount of government support as independent variable.
A meta-analysis is a good way to examine differences between studies on the crowdingout effect. The term "meta-analysis" has been proposed by Glass (1976, p. 3) as referring to "the statistical analysis of a large collection of analysis results from individual studies for the purpose of integrating the findings". Such analyses have become quite common in educational research, psychological research and especially in medical research, and are increasingly used in several other social science areas. Meta-analyses are useful in calculating an average of effect sizes that are found in a number of studies, and in examining differences among studies by running metaregressions of study characteristics on the effect size.
Data were collected in two stages. In the first stage we used EndNote X7 to retrieve studies in the Web of Science database. We search for studies (1) with the term "crowding-out" in the title, keywords or abstract, or (2) that use a pair of possible formulations of the dependent and independent variable in title, keywords or abstract.
1 In the second stage we browsed the reference lists of the studies in the sample that we obtained from Web of Science to look for additional peer-reviewed journal articles that suited our criteria. Our search resulted in a set of 70 studies that matched the criteria, of which the main study characteristics and findings are displayed in the appendix. Because most studies report different estimates of the association between government contributions and private donations we extracted a total of 422 findings of crowding-out or crowding-in. It is not possible to calculate a standardized effect size estimate for every finding, so the sample of standardized 2 Estimates using only subsidies from the American National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) as independent variable are excluded however, because those are matching grants by nature. Studies that use contributions from other private donors as independent variables, like large gifts from famous lead donors intended to increase fundraising success, are excluded because we are theoretically interested in the effect of government policies. In the case of an unstandardized regression or correlation coefficient of 0.5 and independent and dependent variables measured in absolute values, the estimate equals 0.5. When a treatment group donated $20 on average while the government contribution was $25, and the control group donated $10 by a government contribution of $5, the estimate equals (20-10)/(25-5)=0.5. We do not compute an estimate in the case of transformed variables like logarithmic variables or relative measures, neither do we include an estimate if the model includes a quadratic term of government support.
crowding-out effects includes 325 results from 54 studies that estimate the effect on private donations of a $1 increase in government contributions. 4 The sample of effect sizes contains a number of extreme values. To prevent these outliers from having a disproportionally large influence on the results the one percent lowest values are given the value of the first percentile while the one percent highest values are set on the value of the ninety-ninth percentile. This procedure is known as "Winsorizing". As opposed to trimming, where the lowest and highest values are deleted, this method treats the data for outliers while leaving all relevant data points in the sample, making the descriptive and regression results more robust (Tukey 1962, pp. 17-19) .
The sample includes 262 findings of a negative correlation between government support and charitable donations, and 160 findings of a positive correlation. Figure 1 graphically displays all standardized crowding-out estimates after treating the data for outliers, each horizontal line representing one study. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for findings of crowding-out or crowding-in, the crowding-out effect estimate and the study characteristics that are used in the analyses. The median is -0.18 and the robust unweighted mean is -0.17, indicating that a $1 increase in government support is associated with a $0.17 decrease in private charitable donations across all studies.
[ Figure 1 here]
[ Table 1 here]
We test our hypotheses in two stages. First, we examine H1 in a comparison of mean findings in experimental and non-experimental studies. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is used to test whether differences between the groups are statistically significant.
Experiments differ from other studies in many ways, so in the second stage we test the remaining hypotheses for experimental and non-experimental research designs separately. We 4 Missing values on the standardized estimate are not randomly distributed in the sample. Independent samples t-tests show that studies with non-experimental data, studies from Europe, other specifications than fixedeffect or first-differences, regression models without instrumental variables and studies that use only one level of government as independent variable are less likely to report a standardized crowding-out effect size estimate.
run logistic regression analyses on the binary variable of crowding-out (value 0) vs. crowding-in (1) as well as linear regression analyses on the smaller sample of standardized effect size estimates. H3 to H6 are only tested with non-experimental studies because experimental designs do not vary on these dimensions.
The probability of finding a positive association between government support and charitable giving is estimated with a logit model. Because estimates are clustered within studies we allow intercepts to vary across studies, examining the model P(crowding-in) ij / (1 -P(crowding-in) ij ) = β 0 + β 1 X 1ij + β 2 X 2j + … + β k X kij + u j + e ij where P(crowding-in) ij is the probability of finding a positive correlation of the ith estimate in the jth study, β 0 the baseline intercept, β k the regression coefficient of the kth independent variable, u j the study-specific intercept, and e ij the error term for each estimate. We report odds ratios, to be interpreted as the ratio between the odds of finding crowding-in vs. the odds of finding crowding-out. An odds ratio of 1 means that the probabilities are equal, an odds ratio below 1 means a higher probability of finding crowding-out, an odds ratio higher than 1 means that the probability of finding crowding-in is higher.
Correlates of standardized crowding-out effect estimates are estimated by linear Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression models with the crowding-out estimate as the dependent variable and different study characteristics as the independent variables, Y ij = β 0 + β 1 X 1ij + β 2 X 2j + … + β k X kij + u j + e ij where Y is the effect of a $1 increase in government support on the amount donated.
Note that some Xs only vary across studies (e.g. welfare state regime type) and some vary both across and within studies (e.g. the use of fixed-effects regression).
The sample includes estimates in different parts of the voluntary sector. The sample includes 18 studies that estimate effect sizes in the field of arts and culture, 10 in the field of education, 1 study in the field of environment and animals, 7 in the health sector, 8 on international aid, 12 studies that have estimates on social services, 3 on religion, 21 studies that estimate effect sizes on an aggregated measure of giving in different sectors, and 15 studies where the receiving sector is undefined. Comparing the differences between those fields would increase our understanding of varying effects of government efforts, but the numbers of studies and estimates in each field are too small to make reliable claims.
In order to test H2 on differences between welfare state regime types we classify the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia, countries with low decommodification and universalism (Esping-Andersen 1990) as well as low support for government redistribution (Svallfors 1997) as liberal welfare state regimes. The only crosscountry study in the sample (Sokolowski 2013 ) is excluded from the regression analyses.
We include two control variables. The first control is the year of publication because research design characteristics may become increasingly or decreasingly popular over time and the correlations of our variables of interest could be due to period effects. The second control variable is the sample size, which is often used in meta-analyses as an indicator of the statistical power of the estimate (Borenstein et al. 2009) . 5 We take the natural logarithm because the distribution of sample sizes is highly skewed. Table 2 displays the means of our dependent variables for experimental and non-experimental studies. In line with H1, estimates from experiments show more and stronger crowding-out estimates. There are only 5 crowding-in estimates with experimental data in the sample, all from different studies, representing 4 percent of the experimental estimates. In non-experimental studies, there are as many crowding-out estimates as crowding-in estimates. In experiments a $1 increase in government support is associated with a $0.64 decrease in private donations on average (which is significantly different from zero), while archival or self-reported data analyses find a mean increase of $0.06 (not significantly different from zero). The differences between experiments and non-experiments are highly significant.
RESULTS

Data Source
5
Some studies do not report sample sizes for each estimate because it uses sub-samples for different estimates. In those cases we calculated an approximate sample size based on the size of the whole sample.
[ Table 2 here] Table 3 reports the odds ratios of the logistic regression models, and Table 4 
Sample Country
Regression Model and Specification
Our hypotheses predict that crowding-out is stronger in models and specifications that account for omitted variables and endogeneity. Fixed-effects or first-difference specifications are between 3.5 and 4 times more likely to find a positive association between government support and charitable donations (Table 3) , which is contrary to the expectation. In line with our hypothesis, instrumental variable models more often find crowding-out. In the full model (Model VIII) the odds ratio is 0.46, indicating that instrumental variable analyses have a predicted probability of 19 percent to find crowding-out. Although this difference is substantively large, it is not statistically significant. In the linear regression (Table 4) , the differences between models and specifications are small and not significant. There is a large variance in instrumental variable regression estimates: the standard deviation of crowding-out effect size estimates is 0.91 for these models. It is likely that crowding-out findings strongly depend on the instruments that are used.
The unexplained between-study variance ρ does not substantially decrease in models including variables on regression model and specification. The use of fixed-effects, first-difference and instrumental variables varies both between and within studies and does not explain much of the heterogeneity in crowding-out estimates across studies.
Government Support
The expectation in H5 that government subsidies to organizations have a stronger negative effect than direct expenditures must be rejected with our data. Estimates obtained for levels of subsidies as independent variables are 7.9 times more likely to find crowding-in than estimates that use direct government expenditures (Table 3 The intraclass correlation does not substantially decrease when differences between measures of government support are included in the model.
[ Table 3 and 4 here]
Robustness check
As a robustness check we reran our analyses several times, each time excluding one study. The data are already treated for outliers (see under Data and Methods), but studies with extreme values can still have a disproportionally large influence on the results.
The mean effect size estimate of x ̅ =-0.17 has a 95 percent confidence interval between -0.25 and -0.09, and excluding influential studies does not result in a mean outside this range.
The differences between the means of experimental and non-experimental designs are large and robust. Most results from the random-effects models are robust against excluding one of the studies in the sample too, with two exceptions. First, when excluding a study by Hughes, Luksetich & Rooney (2014) GLS regression coefficient of fixed-effects and first-difference models becomes more strongly negative (β=-0.20 in the full model, significant at 10 percent).
Hughes and colleagues find strong positive coefficients in their fixed-effects models with archival data on symphony orchestras. Second, excluding one of the studies by Brooks (2000a) makes the GLS regression coefficient of subsidies to organizations moderately negative (β=-0.19, not significant). Using longitudinal data, Brooks estimates coefficients close to zero but also one positive coefficient of 0.73 among arts and cultural organizations.
In sum, there is robust evidence that experimental designs find more and stronger crowding-out, that fixed-effects of first-difference models less often estimate crowding-out, that studies using subsidies to organizations as measure of government support are more likely to find crowding-out, and that studies using a measure of central government support find more and stronger crowding-out estimates.
DISCUSSION
In previous research, questions have been posed about the effectiveness of new forms of governance with larger roles for nonprofit organizations in the creation and implementation of public services (Ansell and Gash 2008; Provan 2000, 2003; Smith and Lipsky 1993) . In order to understand the contextual dynamics of effective governance, there is a need for robust evidence on the effects of changing government spending on fundraising income. Despite a large number of empirical studies there is no decisive evidence for government support to crowd out private charitable contributions. About two-thirds of the findings in our meta-analysis show a negative correlation between government support and charitable donations, while one third finds a positive correlation. Payne (2009) argues that research on the relation between government support and charitable donations suffers from endogeneity. One way to establish causality is through experimental research designs, and our analysis shows that these designs find more and stronger crowding-out effects than studies using archival or self-reported data. While experiments show that each dollar of government support crowds out $0.64 of private donations, a dollar increase in government support in non-experimental data from surveys, tax return forms or other archival data is associated with a slight increase in lower voluntary contributions on average. Our analysis shows that there is incomplete crowding-out and that the pure altruism model, in which each dollar of mandatory contributions leads to a dollar reduction in voluntary contributions, should be reconsidered. The pure altruism model makes a number of assumptions about the situation in which the government and private donors contribute to a public good, and crowdingout findings depend on the extent to which empirical studies relax these assumptions (Tinkelman 2010) . In experiments people have full information on the level of government contributions, decide on money that is not their own, are sensitive to social cues because they are aware of taking part in a study, and are often undergraduate students that differ in their prosocial behavior and reactions to experimental manipulation (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010). There is an ongoing debate about the extent to which findings from laboratory experiments can be generalized to natural settings (Camerer forthcoming; Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez 2015; Levitt and List 2007) and the large difference in our meta-analysis sample between the estimates obtained in experiments and other types of data emphasizes the importance of this debate.
One could argue that experimental designs provide cleaner estimates of the causal relation because they rule out the interference of other variables. If omitted variable bias explains why experimental findings differ from other findings, we would observe that regression models and specifications that effectively remove this endogeneity produce stronger crowding-out estimates than other regression models. Our results do not confirm this line of reasoning. Neither fixed-effects or first-difference specifications nor the use of instrumental variables can robustly be linked with stronger crowding-out. It is likely that findings in instrumental variable models are highly dependent on the measures that are used as instruments. Similar measures of organizational output and region characteristics are used by some studies as instruments for government support (Brooks 1999; Khanna and Sandler 2000; Payne 2001 ) and by another study as instruments for private giving (Becker and Lindsay 1994) . Hughes and Luksetich (1999) use the same set of variables as instruments for both public and private funding sources in different 2SLS regression models. If a prerequisite for a valid instrumental variable is that it is correlated with X but not with Y or its error term (Morgan and Winship 2007) , it is striking that the same kind of variables are used for both government support and charitable giving. Researchers should be very careful in applying these techniques, and preferably use a range of different models, specifications and instrumental variables to estimate the effect of government support in a certain dataset.
Our results also challenge the argument of indirect crowding-out, i.e. that the fundraising behavior of organizations partly explain why people change their donations after government investments or budget cuts (Andreoni and Payne 2003, 2011; Hughes, Luksetich, and Rooney 2014) . Subsidies to organizations are much more likely to crowd in donations than direct government expenditures, but they do not lead to stronger crowding-in effects on average. A possible explanation for this result is that the effect is non-linear, with smaller subsidies enhancing donations and larger subsidies discouraging them (Borgonovi 2006; Brooks 2000b Brooks , 2003b ). This also means that subsidizing does not make organizations dependent of public funding, but rather seems to encourage revenue diversification at the organizational level.
Federal policy programs are effective in stimulating private giving. Our analyses show that measures of central government support are positively related to charitable donations, while measures of multiple governmental levels are negatively related to giving. This is contrary to what we expect from models developed by Steinberg (1989 Steinberg ( , 1991 and Lindsey and Steinberg (1990) . If there would be a "flypaper effect", meaning that federal funding induces support from lower levels of government to the same public good, studies of central government support would underestimate the total crowding-out effect. The results from this meta-analysis contradict this argument.
Our analysis suffers from a few limitations. First, there are more differences between research designs than we accounted for in this paper. A common critique on meta-analyses is that they compare apples and oranges by including findings that diverge in many more ways than can be tested for (Borenstein et al. 2008, pp. 379-380; Petticrew and Roberts 2006, pp. 203-204; Wolf 1986, pp. 14-15) . Charitable donations may include gifts from individuals but, when using archival data, also from companies, foundations and other organizations. There are many grants, purchases, subsidies and vouchers that are classified under the heading of government support.
We aimed to focus on unconditional government funding, but aggregate measures of government support often include matching grants. Due to the small number of studies and estimates per field we did not distinguish between different parts of the nonprofit sector, nor did we align organizations on the extent to which they are subsidy-dependent. Without doubt, different measures of the dependent and independent variable lead to different findings. In future research, comparing the effects of different types of government support and on different types of organizations would add much to our understanding about nonprofit financing across society.
The most important difference we found is the one between experimental and non-experimental studies, and there are numerous differences between these two approaches that cannot all be examined by meta-analytical techniques. In the current analysis we are not certain to what extent the stronger crowding-out results in experiments are due to the information that is provided, the endowment participants receive, demand effects, subject pool composition effects or the absence of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. It has also been argued that the effect varies with the level of government support (Borgonovi 2006; Brooks 2000b Brooks , 2003b , the salience of the tax (Eckel, Grossman, and Johnston 2005) and the number of other donors (Ribar and Wilhelm 2002) . Systematic comparisons between data that vary on these dimensions could provide more insight. Furthermore, the current analysis concerns the relationship between funding sources without paying attention to the actors involved or the governance processes behind it. Although the environmental dynamics are important for organizations and the analysis is valuable as such, reactions on funding streams may depend on many other factors like institutional characteristics, management styles and relations between the actors involved (Ansell and Gash 2008; Milward and Provan 2003) . More research would be necessary to shed light on the factors that moderate crowding-out effects.
A second important limitation is that the estimates in our meta-analysis are not necessarily a random sample. Weak or non-significant results are generally more likely to remain unpublished (Borenstein et al. 2009, pp. 277-292; Francis 2012; Petticrew and Roberts 2006, pp. 230-235; Rosenthal 1984, p. 125; Stanley 2005) and our search technique excludes findings from books and "grey literature". Although the findings presented here are robust, our analyses concern a possibly biased sample of all crowding-out estimates that empirical research is able to measure. Being a generally recognized problem of scientific publishing, publication bias is less likely to be a problem in crowding-out research because null findings in this area have important policy implications. An analysis of unpublished studies could be added in order to examine this bias, which is beyond the scope of the current article.
Despite these limitations, this paper makes an important contribution to the literature on the interaction between organizations and their environment. In field research situations, where different environmental processes are at play, individual giving is generally not strongly affected by varying levels of government support. However, private donors are responsive to changing government support under certain circumstances. When people are aware of government budgets they might change their donations, so the effects of public policy largely depend on information flows. In general we advise policy makers to be careful with the reduction of public spending, since budget cuts will decrease total funding for public goods. This has important consequences for governance styles in which the government collaborates with nonprofit actors, like nonprofit contracting (Smith & Lipsky 1993) , 'collaborative governance' (Ansell & Gash 2008) and interorganizational networks (Milward and Provan 2003) . When governments are able to maintain high levels of public funding, they may continue to seek collaborations with nonprofit actors as complementary in the funding and implementation of public services. Considering that private giving is generally not crowded out by public funding and can even be increased through central government support and subsidies to organizations, the great variety in governmentnonprofit collaboration forms provides ample opportunity to effectively provide services in different organizational arrangements.
CONCLUSION
There is a widespread belief among politicians and intellectuals that government expenditures suppress private participation, an assumption that lies behind policy decisions in which the government cuts its spending and aims to shift public services towards nonprofit organizations that are largely dependent of private funding. The current meta-analysis shows that private charitable donations are not likely to be crowded out by government support and that each dollar of extra public funding increases total contributions to the public good. Instead of substituting each other, there is ample opportunity for government and nonprofits to jointly enhance the scope and quality of public services. How donors and nonprofit organizations react on changes in government funding largely depends on the context, which is an area for further empirical research.
FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Dot graph of crowding-out effect estimates per study 
